This paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies, by focusing on the "experience goods" aspect of many products. Return policies allow consumers to defer their purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods. In so doing, they insure consumers against ex post loss, which allows a monopoly seller to charge more than otherwise. It is shown that the seller adopts the return policy when consumers are highly risk averse or retail costs are high. Consumers are strictly better off under the return policy, but there is too little adoption of the policy in equilibrium.
often sufficient for stores to accept the return. The "no-questions-asked" full refund policy is customary with many big retailers.
For these latter products, a more compelling rationale for return policies has to do with their "experience good" nature: Customers do not fully know their preferences for the products until after they gain some experience with them. Such an experience good nature may reflect a simple psychological reaction, like "buyer's remorse," but it may also result from the fact that the purchaser of a good may not be its final consumer. For example, a shirt bought for a family member or as a gift may run into the problems of wrong color, wrong size, or wrong style. Return policies allow customers essentially to defer their purchasing decisions until after gaining some experience with the products. A consumer who has learned that he does not like a product can nullify his purchase by simply returning it. This paper explores the consumer learning implications of return policies, by developing a model where customers realize idiosyncratic valuations of the good after their purchase. The analysis focuses on the following trade-off for a monopoly seller: on the one hand, the return policies insure consumers against ex post loss, allowing the seller to charge a higher price than otherwise; on the other hand, the seller can never induce consumers to buy at a price above their ex post valuations, which she could do, for some consumers, with a no-return policy. It is shown that the return policy is optimal if the consumers are sufficiently risk averse or retail costs are high. Superior risk sharing makes consumers strictly better off under the return policy, but the seller's failure to internalize this benefit leads to too little adoption of the return policy in equilibrium, relative to the socially efficient outcome.
I am not aware of any literature on consumer return policies. Pasternack [1985] and Marvel and Peck [1994] study the manufacturers' return policies toward retailers, with a special focus on channel coordination in the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty. The focus on consumer learning and delayed purchase distinguishes the current paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section II. Section III studies equilibrium adoption of return policies in the monopoly setting. Section IV explores its welfare implications. Section V concludes.
H. MODEL
A monopoly seller (retailer) faces a unit mass of consumers, each of whom desires at most one unit of a good. The seller is risk neutral and maximizes expected profits, and she incurs retail costs of C E [0, i) for each unit that she carries, which includes the payments to a manufacturer.
The consumers' preferences for the good are unknown at the time of purchase, but they are leamed after purchase. A consumer's preference is parameterized by a 
Proof. I show that E[U(v-Vce)] = kE[U(v) -U(Vce)]
= O for some real number k. Note that the seller's profit is inversely related to the degree of consumer risk aversion. Under the no-return policy, consumers bear the entire risk associated with their uncertain ex post valuation. As risk aversion increases, the seller must lower her price to compensate consumers for the risk. Suppose now that the seller adopts the return policy. Then, all the consumers will attempt to purchase the good initially and decide whether to return it, after learning their valuations. Given a price, p, a consumer with ex post valuation v will return the good if and only if v <p. Thus, only [1 -F(p)] consumers will eventually keep the good. Given this, the seller's optimal strategy is to hold an inventory of precisely q = 1 -F(p). This limited inventory leads to an initial rationing of some consumers, but eventually all consumers whose valuations exceed p will obtain 3In practice, even a free return policy requires a trip to the store, so returning a good may not be costless. A positive return cost does not alter the results of this paper qualitatively, however. 
T(E[v], c) < 0 for all c < c, and T(., c) is continuous. It is also unique since T(., c)
is strictly decreasing. The second statement then follows from the monotonicity of (Vce, 0).
Q.E.D.
The proposition implies, in particular, that the return policy can never be optimal if consumers are risk neutral and retail costs are sufficiently small. The intuition for this result is clear. The no-return policy essentially implements the outcome of "selling the firm to the agent," well known in the principal-agent literature.7 The seller (principal) transfers the entire risk to the consumers (agent) and by doing so generates the highest expected profits if consumers are risk neutral. By contrast, the return policy eliminates the consumers' downside risk, which means that the seller does not extract the full consumer surplus.8 As the consumers become more risk averse, the no-return policy becomes less attractive, however, since the seller must lower her price to compensate consumers for the risk. Such risk compensation is unnecessary under the return policy. Likewise, the presence of high retail costs favors the return policy, relatively: the seller can protect her profit margin by selling only to high-valuation consumers under the return policy, whereas the seller has no such option under the no-return policy.
IV WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RETURN POLICY
The analysis in the previous section yields several welfare implications. First, the return policy leads to better risk-sharing between the seller and risk-averse consumers, by eliminating the downside risk of the consumers.9 This effect unambiguously benefits the consumers. Second, the return policy typically results in screening some low-valuation consumers. The welfare implications of this effect are ambiguous. If retail costs are small, then the screening will result in the loss of some consumer surplus. If retail costs are large, however, the screening of low-valuation consumers will result in an efficiency gain, since the return policy will simply reallocate a good from a consumer with low valuation to a consumer with high valuation, above the retail costs.
The combined effect is unambiguously positive, at least for the consumers. Consumers are always better off when the seller adopts the return policy. Under the return policy, the consumers are protected from any loss, so they receive strictly positive expected utility.10 By contrast, the consumers receive zero expected utility under the no-return policy (see Lemma 1). The consumers' strict preference for the return policy means, however, that the seller does not fully internalize the social gains from adopting the return policy. The consequence of the latter is too little adoption of the return policy in equilibrium, relative to the socially efficient outcome. The next proposition formalizes this observation, using the total certainty equivalent of the seller-and consumer-surplus as a welfare criterion.11 It shows that the return policy dominates the no-return policy in welfare for a larger set of parameter values than in profit.
Proposition 2. The return policy is socially desirable whenever the seller adopts it. The converse may not hold. Formally, the return policy is socially desirable, In this paper, I have studied the economic rationale for a consumer return policy, from the perspective of consumer learning about goods. The results of this paper do not just apply to the return policy for experience goods, but, to a limited degree, they also apply to various other return policies and other retail practices that promote customer learning of products. Widely used retail practices such as the money-back guarantee and limited-period free trial of a new products can promote customer learning of the products at low risk and can play a role similar to that of the return policy studied in this paper.14 Likewise, part of the rationale for the in-store customer service and, to some extent, call-in technical support for products like personal computers can be understood in a similar vein.
1 " Expected total surplus is not an appropriate welfare criterion, since it does not capture the consumer risk aversion. Since the CARA utility function displays no wealth effects, however, the certainty equivalents of the total surplus can measure the level of welfare. This criterion is used by Milgrom [1990, 1991] in their principal-agent models.
12 The proposition does not contain the "only if" part, since the social welfare difference between the two regimes cannot generally be shown to be monotonic in (-vc, c). ? Blackwell Pubhshers Ltd. 1996 This paper represents an exploratory study of a largely unexplored -yet practically important -issue, so the model captures only the most salient feature of the return policy. A more comprehensive study should attempt to extend the model in several ways. First, I have considered only two choices for the firm: the return policy and the no-retur policy. In practice, firms offer a variety of return policies, differing in terms of return requirements and return periods. This variety presumably allows finrs to vary the difficulty of return and, more importantly, fine tune the amount of consumer learning prior to the purchasing decision. In some cases, a manufacturer's quality decision, such as the size of clothes, can also affect the actual return.15 Second, consumer moral hazard must be incorporated. The possibility of consumers abusing return policies is an important consideration that limits their use. Some of the well-known cases include return of TV sets after Super Bowl Sunday, return of camcorders after a daughter's wedding, or "borrowing" of party dresses for special occasions.16 Return policies must be designed to mitigate these kinds of moral hazard problem. For example, prohibiting cash refimd (i.e., return only in kind) is effective against some of the above moral hazard problems. Third, a more detailed specification of consumer preferences can be introduced to add realism. For example, one can think of a specification of consumer preferences that involves ex ante diversity as well as ex post diversity. Finally, oligopoly competition must be introduced. Some of the return policies may be introduced as a result of competition among retailers rather than because of the profit and efficiency gains that we studied in this paper These extensions will reveal new dimensions in the adoption of return policies and warrant firther studies. 
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